We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combination of temporalised agency and temporalised normative positions. We argue about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent and reason with them in the setting of Defeasible Logic.
MOTIVATION AND LAYOUT
An increasing number of works on agents assume that in artificial societies normative concepts may play a decisive role, allowing for the flexible co-ordination of autonomous agents [5, 20, 15] . In particular, it seems crucial to model organisations of agents in terms of policy-based normative systems; accordingly an organisation should be characterised by specifying the normative positions relevant to design its structure. These positions include duties, permissions, but also powers, as for instance powers of creating further normative positions on the head of other agents. In this paper we will develop a formal machinery to account for several fundamental concepts that are required to model policy-based normative systems. These concepts will be embedded in a nonmonotonic and computationally-oriented framework based on Defeasible Logic (DL).
From the conceptual standpoint, it is well known that the basic deontic qualifications (obligatory, forbidden, permitted and facultative) are not sufficient to capture all fundamental normative notions, such as the concepts of rights and power. For this reason, we will first provide an account in DL of the notion of other-directed obligation [14] to express, e.g., the first Hohfeldian set of fundamental concepts: duty, right, noright, and privilege. Second, we shall focus on different kinds of normative conditionals. This will enable us to characterise also the idea of normative power and articulate many potestative concepts such as the second Hohfeldian set of concepts: power, liability (or, subjection, to avoid confusion with the notion of liability, as used in tort law), disability, and immunity. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. In general, we shall see how the analysis of normative conditionality and normative positions has to include temporal aspects in order to capture a number of nuances in the perspective of framing a fine-grained classification of such concepts. In fact, normative determinations take place along the axis of time: Normative preconditions hold or happen in certain temporally characterised occasions, and consequently their effects too hold or happen within temporal bounds. In providing an analysis of normative conditionality, we cannot refrain from introducing some temporal notions, though avoiding as much as possible the complexities of temporal logics. In this regard, we will basically distinguish between "persistent" normative positions, which follow the so-called law of temporal inertia or temporal persistence, and those that are temporally co-occurent with regard to some events or states of affairs.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This section provides a systematic account of the basic legal concepts discussed in the paper. Rather than providing general definitions, we prefer to illustrate all notions by way of examples. We will follow the approach and notation developed in [23] . The notation adopted there is based on the use of modal operators and on formalisms taken from the Event Calculus. We prefer in this section to use this notation as it looks more intuitive, though it can be hardly embedded, as it is, within DL.
These are the contexts whose logical behaviour will be caracterised in the section.
Actions
With regard to actions, we distinguish two characterisations, a behavioural and productive characterisation. The first is concerned with specifying the behaviour performed by the agent, the second, the result the agent achieves.
Does Tom [smoke] (Tom is smoking)
Brings Alex [the air is polluted] (Alex brings it about that the air is polluted)
The productive action can also consist in making so that a conditional holds true.
Obligation and Permission
By applying to actions the usual deontic operators, we obtain obligations. Obligations can concern both behavioural and productive actions:
Obl Does j [lecture] (it is obligatory that j lectures) Obl Brings j [k's personal data are cancelled] (it is obligatory that j brings it about that k's personal data are cancelled)
With regard to the obligations whose content is the negation of an action, we speak of prohibition.
(it is obligatory that j does not smoke, or also, it is forbidden that j smokes)
In order to express the basic deontic modalities, besides obligations we also need permissions, which also concern both kinds of actions. Here are a couple of examples:
Perm Does j [park in the University courtyard] (it is permitted that j parks in the University courtyard) Perm Brings j [k's personal data are accessible to the police authority] (it is permitted that j brings it about that k's personal data are accessible to the police authority)
We shall later develop a logical analysis of permissions. By now, let us just state some properties which appear to be important to us. First of all a permission must be incompatible with a prohibition. Secondly, the holding of a permission does not mean simply that there is no prohibition (we want a strong notion of a permission).
The simplest way to meet this requirement consists in viewing the permission of an action as the negation of its prohibition. This is the idea that was followed in [23] .
Here we take a slightly different approach: We model permissive propositions as defeaters of the corresponding obligations. Accordingly, to state that proposition A is permitted is equivalent to say the normative proposition Obl ¬A is not derived. This allows us to exploit the treatment of defeaters in defeasible logic to model permissions. As we shall see, this idea leads us to an unpleasant implication, so long as we remain within defeasible logic: We can never infer that something is permitted, since defeaters block inferences, but do not establish any conclusion. To remedy this fact, we identify the derivation of the permission of A with the situation where a defeater of Obl ¬A exists, whose antecedent can be established and which is superior to the all rules it attempts to defeat (all rules for Obl A, whose antecedent can be established).
Directed Normative Propositions
An essential component of legal concepts, though this has been denied by some legal philosophers, and more notably by Hans Kelsen (see [23] ), is their teleological dimension: normative propositions. Normative propositions are made legally binding (and are recognised as such) since their adoption and practice advance certain goals. These goals may consist in either:
• a collective one (collective health)
• and individual one (the health of any individual)
The idea of legal teleology, when the goal of a certain proposition consists in the benefit of a particular individual leads us to the idea of a directed normative proposition, that is a normative proposition which is aimed at (which has the goal of) satisfying he intererest of a particular person. A specification of this idea is provided by the notion of an other-directed obligation, as in the following examples. An other directed permission towards k that j does A does not entail that k is prohibited from preventing j from doing A: it only consists in rejecting that k is forbidden, for the benefit of k, from doing A . Thus k, notwithstanding the permission can still attempt to prevent A in all legal ways (for instance, Tom can threaten Mary the he shall leave his house and sell his land to a constructor that will build a 20 storeys skyscraper, if she raises her building).
Obl

Obligational Rights
On the basis of the notion of directed obligation, we can construct the notion of an obligational right, which is the other face of a directed obligation. Thus we obtain the idea of a right as consisting in the protection of an interest (through the obligation upon somebody else), an idea which was defended in particular by Bentham and Jhering (see [23] ; for a discussion of directed obligations and rights, see, e.g., [14] ). We can also introduce the notion of permissive right, which is a directed permission aimed at satisfying the interest of the permitted person. Note that the holder of a permissive right, in the sense of its beneficiary, is the author of the permitted action, rather than the person toward which this permission exists: In a permissive right PermRight k Does j A, j is the beneficiary of the right, while k, the addressee of the permission, bears the burden of it (in the sense that k's interest is not protected by means of a prohibition that j does A). For instance, to express that Mary has the permissive right toward Tom to raise a building up to 15 meters, we write: Note that the distinction between being one's permission to do A and another's prohibition to prevent A also applies to permissive rights: PermRight k Does j A does not entail that k is prohibited from preventing A.
Hohfeldian Notions
Further combinations of these notions lead us to the ideas of permissive rights and absolute rights, for which we refer to [23] , and to the Hohfeldian notions of a privilege and a noright, which we can simply define as follows.
The Hohfeldian notion of a privilege can be expressed through our notion of other-directed permission: To say that j has a privilege toward k with regard to A means that j is permitted, toward k, to omit A. Equivalently, we may use the notion of noright to express that one does not have the obligational right that another does a certain action, that is, to denote the situation when the latter is permitted toward the first to omit that action. The ideas we have just defined lead us to first square of Hohfeldian concepts, which we call the Hohfeldian obligational set, where: 
Normative Conditionals
Besides obligations and permissions, the main structure of legal knowledge is provided by normative conditionals. Normative conditionals establish a connection according to which and antecedent normatively determines a consequent, which we represent as:
where the superscript n indicates the specifically normative nature of the connection. Here is an example, which uses the notions we introduced above. Conditionals may, on the one hand, be concerned with the a deontic or a non deontic property (state of affairs) or, on the other hand, they may be concerned with an event determining the initiation of the property (which continues after the event has taken place), with a property determining the emergence of another property (which only exists so long as the determining property exists), or with an event determining the emergence of another event.
Here are an example of non deontic supervenience and initiation. 
Notions of Power
The idea of a normative conditional leads us to the notion of a power. In a first sense we say that a person has a power (an action power) when, according to a normative conditional, an action of that person determines a normative effect. Thus we view the two expressions below as equivalent: In a more specific sense, we may speak of a power only under a teleological perspective, that is when the normative connection between an antecedent action and a consequent normative effect has the function of enabling and promoting the achievement of the effect through the action. This excludes from this restricted notion of a power the case when an action determines a penalty against its author (we do not want to say that a person has the power of achieving the subjection to punishment by committing a crime). When such a normative connection also has the further purpose of promoting the interest of the author of the action, we speak of a potestative-right. Thus, we have the following distinction:
• An enabling-power is an action-power intended to enable the normative result of the action
• A potestative-right is an enabling power intended to further the interests of the power holder This is the notion of a right to which those authors which have defended a power-based theory of rights, like When an agent j has the power of creating a normative position Pos concerning another person k, we can say that k is subject to this power, and when there is no such power we can say that j has a disability to create that position and that k has an immunity with regard to it. This leads us to the Hohfeldian potestative set. 
Proclamation and Proclamative Power
A special instance of the idea of a potestative right concerns the case when one person has normative ability to create a normative position (in general, to realise a normative proposition) by stating this intention. The act of stating one's intention to produce a certain normative result is what we call proclamation, and a proclamation is effective (produces its intended result) when there is a rule like the following:
IF Procl x ϕ THEN n Brings x ϕ (for any person x, and proposition ϕ, if x proclaims ϕ, then ϕ is realised)
When such a rule exists, we say that the author of the proclamation has a corresponding proclamative power. On the basis of the idea of a proclamation, we can develop further interesting legal concepts, such as the concept of the notion of representation. On the other hand, we can also build the idea of a source of law.
THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
Our approach is motivated by the inherent computational complexity of multimodal logics (see, e.g., [12] ). In addition, very often the notion of modality adopted for multiagent systems is by its own nature non-monotonic and so does not lend itself to necessitation [10] . In general, the addition of (normal) modal operators to the classical propositional base leads to the increase of complexity of the logic. This is mainly due to: (1) the rules to introduce modalities, such as the necessitation rule, (2) the axioms governing the behaviour of modalities and their mutual interaction. These problems are even more crucial in multiagent systems where the combination of a number of modalities is usually required and the need of efficient reasoning mechanisms is compelling (see, e.g., [7] ). This paper thus proposes a general solution to the mentioned problems by exploiting the nice computational features of DL and by setting specific rules for introducing modal operators: Rules are primarily meant to introduce modalities in terms of provability of literals. This solution keeps the system manageable. A literal will be modalised with, say, X if it is deduced via rules specifically devised to express concept X. Given the conceptual framework previously described, this methodology is applied to the following building blocks, which are needed to correctly represent the normative aspects of policy-based systems of agents 1 .
Actions
The formalism aims to capture the idea of modal agency [6] (A ∧ B) , and are closed under logical equivalence. If these are some general properties for Brings, a specific axiom advanced in [22] for this operator is Brings i Brings j A → ¬Brings i A. It corresponds to the idea that the bring-about operator expresses actions performed directly and personally: It is counterintuitive that the same agent brings it about that A and brings it about that somebody else achieves A. Accordingly, we will devise a set of rules to encode the action transitions occurring, under certain circumstances, as the results of actions. The applicability of these rules will allow for the introduction of the operator Brings. In addition, since we want to be also able to reason about explicit actions, we will extend the language of DL by adding a set of action symbols. These symbols will occur only in the antecedent of action rules, and this precisely because such rules are meant to derive the states of affairs resulting from the performance of actions.
Normative Conditionals
It is possible to distinguish different kinds of normative conditional. As was argued, all of them indeed can be conceptually reduced to a single normative conditional "IF A THEN n B": what differentiates each kind of link is the type of antecedent and/or consequent that occur in the conditional link. Thus a normative conditional is meant to simply obtain any kind of normative consequence. However, to make things clear, we will distinguish, in the syntax of DL, different kinds of rules, and we simply establish in the proof conditions for literals the appropriate criteria to account for this reduction. We will identify the following types of normative rules:
Rules for persistent obligations. These rules, if applicable, permit to infer literals to be modalised by obligations that persist unless some other, subsequent, and incompatible states of affairs, actions, or obligations terminate them. For example, the obligation towards an agent of paying the damages she caused in a car crash will hold until the agent has not paid such damages.
Rules for co-occurrent obligations. These rules allow for the inference of obligations which hold on the condition and only while the antecedents of these rules hold. For example, the obligation not speak loud in the church will hold only when the agent is in the church.
Rules for the count-as link. The count-as relation is meant to express the idea of institutional power [24] . For example, if i signs a document on behalf of her boss j, such a document is as it were signed by j only if i has been empowered to do this: i's signature counts as j's signature. In principle, this kind of ability should be distinguished from the practical capacity to obtain a certain state of affairs. The exercise of a power may not be successful: its being successful, within the institutional context, depends on whether that institution makes it effective. In [13, 7] , for example, different formalisations of this notion have been developed. We will not commit ourselves in choosing one of the these approaches. Both approaches characterise the count-as link by also introducing the a modality D s , which is meant, though according to different intepretations, to qualify the facts and propositions that hold within a given institution s. As we shall see, here it not required to use D s , which would be necessary in our framework only in the case in which we should deal with facts and propositions that hold within different institutions. From the conceptual point of view, we will view the count-as link as a generic normative conditional whose consequences are not necessarily deontic. Deontic rules will be then a considered as generic normative rules which specifically allow for the deduction of deontic literals. In DL, we will syntactically distinguish the two types of rules, but we will impose, according to this view, that the provability of deontic consequences is a sub-type of the provability via count-as rules.
Time
Since we will operate in a temporalised setting, we will not only impose that obligations be temporalised, but also that any literal may be labelled by time instants. For the sake of simplicity, here will assume the time to be linear and discrete. Notice that Event Calculus' temporal notions and predicates " initiates" and "terminates" will be rendered in DL by reframing the idea of DL superiority relation between different types of temporalised rules.
Proclamations
The last logic component we will use is the modal operator Procl, which will capture the idea of proclamation [7] . It expresses any speech act (proclaiming) that is intended to modify the institutional world. The action of proclamation is not necessarily successful: Procl i A is just an attempt of i to achieve A. Whether it is successful or not, will depend on whether an institution, for example, will make it effective by means of appropriate count-as rules.
The System
DL [18, 1] is a simple, efficient but flexible non-monotonic formalism that can deal with many different intuitions of nonmonotonic reasoning [2] , and efficient and powerful implementations have been proposed [17, 4] . In the last few years DL has been applied in many fields; in addition DL encompasses other existing formalisms proposed in the AI & Law field such as Prakken and Sartor's [21] and Loui and Simari's [25] (see, [9] ), and recent work shows that DL is suitable for extensions with modal and deontic operators [10] and violations which in turn allows DL to be used to represent and reason with business contracts [11, 8] . Here we propose a non-monotonic logic of institutional agency based on the framework for DL developed in [1] .
As usual with non-monotonic reasoning, we have to specify 1) how to represent a knowledge base and 2) the inference mechanism used to reason with the knowledge base. The language of Normative Defeasible Logic consists of a finite set of agents A , a (numerable) set of atomic propositions Prop = {p, q,... }, a set of action symbols Act = {α i , β i ,...} i∈A , a discrete totally ordered set of instants of time T = {t 1 ,t 2 ,...}, the modal operator Obl of obligation, and the parametrised modal operators Obl i , Brings i , and Procl i (where i ∈ A ), and the negation sign ¬. We define the permission operator Perm i as the non-derivation via defeaters of
We supplement the usual definition of literal (an atomic proposition or the negation of it), with the following clauses 1. an action symbol is a literal and so is the negation of an action symbol; We will call literals obtained from clause i) above action literals. Literals obeying conditions ii)-iv) are called modal literals. Given a literal l with ∼ l we denote the complement of l, that is, if l is a positive literal p then ∼ l = ¬p, and if l = ¬p then ∼ l = p. Finally we introduce the notion of temporal literals. A temporal literal is a pair l : t where l is a literal and t is an instant of time. Intuitively the meaning of a temporal literal l : t is that l holds at time t.
if l is a literal then
Knowledge in defeasible logic can be represented in two ways: facts and rules.
Facts are indisputable statements, represented either in form of states of affairs (literal and modal literal) and actions that have been performed. For example, "John is a minor". In the logic, this might be expressed as Minor (John) .
A rule, on the other hand, describes the relationship between a set of literals (premises) and a literal (conclusion), and we can specify how strong the relationship is and the mode the rule connects the antecedent and the conclusion. As usual rules allow us to derive new conclusions given a set of premises. Since rules have a mode, the conclusions will be modal literals. As far as the strength of rules is concerned we distinguish between strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters; for the mode we have: count-as rules, describing the basic inference mechanism internal to an institution; deontic rules or rules for conditional obligations, determining the conditions under which an obligation holds; and rules for agency, or results-in rules, i.e., rules that encode the transitions from state to state occurring as the result of actions performed by the agents within the organisation. As we will see, the idea of conditional obligations and results-in rules is to introduce modalised conclusions. Accordingly if we have a results-in rule for p for an agent i, then this means that the rule allows for the derivation of Brings i p, and if we have an applicable conditional obligation for an agent i whose conclusion is p, then the rule can be used to support the derivation of Obl i p. Formally a rule r consists of its antecedent (or body) A(r) (A(r) may be omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set of temporal literals, an arrow (→ for strict rules, ⇒ for defeasible rules, and ; for defeaters), and its consequent (or head) C(r) which is a temporal literal. Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of strict rules in R by R s , the set of strict and defeasible rules in R by R sd , the set of defeasible rules in R by R d , and the set of defeaters in R by R dft . R[q : t] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q : t. We will use R c for the set of count-as rules, R O i to denote the set of rules for obligation for agent i, and R i for the set of results-in rules for agent i. Given the intended use and meaning of the rules, and the constraints we imposed on the definition of literals, we have to impose some constraints on the literals that can appear in the head of a rule. Thus Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable (e.g., facts) then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is "every minor is a person". Written formally:
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of such a rule is "every person has the capacity to perform legal acts to the extent that the law does not provide otherwise"; written formally:
The idea is that if we know that someone is a person, then we may conclude that he/she has legal capacity, unless there is other evidence suggesting that he/she has not.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. For example the defeater WeakEvidence : t ; p c ¬guilty : t states that if pieces of evidence are assessed as weak, then they can prevent the derivation of a "guilty" verdict; on the other hand they cannot be used to support a "not guilty" conclusion.
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules r :
person(X) : t ⇒ p c hasLegalCapacity(X) : t r : minor(X) : t ⇒ p c ¬hasLegalCapacity(X) : t which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a minor has legal capacity. But if we introduce a superiority relation with r r, then we can indeed conclude that the minor does not have legal capacity. It turns out that we only need to define the superiority relation over rules with contradictory conclusions. Also notice that a cycle in the superiority relation is counter-intuitive from the knowledge representation perspective. In the above example, it makes no sense to have both r r and r r. Consequently, the defeasible logic we discuss requires an acyclic superiority relation.
A defeasible theory D is a structure (F, R, ) where F is a finite set of facts, R a finite set of rules (comprising strict rules, defeasible rules and defeater), and a superiority relation over R.
Let X range over the modes of rules. A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms: +Δ X q : t meaning that q is definitely provable, at time t, in D (i.e., using only facts and strict rules of mode X).
−Δ X q : t meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable, at time t, in D.
+∂ X q : t meaning that q is defeasibly provable, at time t, in D.
−∂ X q : t meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable, at time t, in D.
For example, +∂ t O i q : t 0 means that we a defeasible proof for Obl i q at t 0 , or, in other words, that Obl i q holds at time t 0 . However, these tags do not take care whether a conclusion q : t has been obtain via transient rules (that is, q holds only at time t) or via persistent rules, in such a case for every t such that t < t , the property q persists at time t , unless we have other evidence on the contrary, i.e., a piece of evidence that terminates the property q. To reflect these issues we will introduce auxiliary proof tags that indicate whether a conclusion is persistent or transient. The proof tags are labelled with the mode used to derive the rule, according to the proof conditions given below.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P(1),...,P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying the proof conditions (which correspond to inference rules for each of the kinds of conclusion). P(1..n) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length n Before introducing the proof conditions for the proof tags relevant to this paper we provide some auxiliary notions.
Given a temporal literal q and a proof P = (P(1),...,P(n)) in D we will say that q is Δ-provable in P, or simply Δ-provable, if there is a line P(m) of the derivation such that either:
1. if q = l : t, then either:
2. if q = Brings i l : t, then either:
3. if q = ¬Brings i l : t, then either:
4. if q = Obl i l : t, then either:
• Brings i l : t is Δ-provable in P(1..m − 1).
5. if q = Perm i l : t, then either:
The definition of ∂ -provable has the same first four clauses where Δ is replaced with ∂ ; however, the last clause, the clause for Perm i , has the following additional condition
As we will see π is a special proof tag designed explicitly to handle this case.
In a similar way we can define a literal to be Δ-and ∂ -rejected by taking, respectively, the definition of Δ-provable and ∂ -provable and changing all positive proof tags into negative proof tags, adding a negation in front of the literal when the literal is prefixed by a modal operator Brings j , and replacing all the ors by ands. Thus, for example, we can say that a literal Brings i l is ∂ -rejected if, in a derivation, we have a line −∂ i l, and the literal ¬Brings i ¬l is ∂ -rejected if we have +∂ i ¬l and so on.
Let X be a modal operator and # is either Δ or ∂ . A literal l is # X -provable if the modal literal Xl is #-provable; l is # X -rejected if the literal Xl is #-rejected.
Let X range over the set {c, O i , i}. Given a strict rule r we will say that the rule is Δ X -applicable iff 1. r ∈ R X and ∀a k : t k ∈ A(r), a k : t k is Δ-provable; or 2. if X = c and r ∈ R c s , i.e., r is a count-as rule, then
The conditions for a rule r to be ∂ X -applicable are the same as those for Δ X -applicable, but where we replace Δ with ∂ .
Let X range over the set {c, O i , i}. Given a strict rule r we will say that the rule is Δ X -discarded iff 1. r ∈ R X and ∃a k : t k ∈ A(r), a k : t k is Δ-rejected; or 2. if X = c and r ∈ R c s , i.e., r is a count-as rule, then ∃a k : t k , a k : t k is Δ X -rejected.
The conditions for a rule r to be ∂ X -discarded are the same as those for Δ X -discarded, but where we replace Δ with ∂ .
We are now ready to define the proof theory of defeasible logic, that is, the inference conditions to derive tagged literals from a given theory D.
We begin with the proof conditions to determine whether a literal is a definite transient conclusion of a theory D.
The above condition is the normal condition for definite (positive) proofs in defeasible logic, that is, monotonic derivations using forward chaining, or modus ponens. The only thing to notice is the case of +Δ t X were X is a modal operator. In this case a strict countas rule can be understood as a modal rule, either as a deontic rule or a results-in rule, if all the literals in the body of the rule are modalised with the appropriate operator. For example, given the count-as rule 
To prove that a definite (transient) conclusion is not possible we have to show that all attempts to give a definite proof of the conclusion fail.
We can now move to persistent definite conclusions.
: r is Δ X -applicable; or 3) ∃t ∈ T : t < t and +Δ p X q : t ∈ P(1..n).
The first two clauses are the same as the corresponding clauses in the definition of definite transient conclusion and what the condition adds is the persistence condition (3). The persistence condition allows us to reiterate literals definitely proved at previous times, or, using the terminology of Section 2, that a persistent property q initiated at a time before the current time. For example, given the the theory 
: r is Δ X -discarded; and 3) ∀t ∈ T : t < t and −Δ p X q : t ∈ P(1..n).
In addition to the conditions we have for the transient case, here we have to check that for all instants of time before now the persistent property has not been proved.
According to the above conditions to prove that q is a definite conclusion of D at time t we have to consider whether q is a definite transient conclusion of D at time t or if it is a definite persistent conclusion at t. Thus
A definite conclusion is not provable at time t if it is not possible to prove it persistently nor transiently.
Defeasible derivations have an argumentation like structure divided in three phases. In the first phase we put forward a supported reason (rule) for the conclusion we want to prove. Then in the second phase we consider all possible (actual and not) reasons against the desired conclusion. Finally in the last phase, we have to rebut all the counterarguments. This can be done in two ways: we can show that some of the premises of a counterargument do not obtain, or we can show that the argument is weaker than an argument in favour of the conclusion. This is formalised by the following (constructive) proof conditions. Again we start with the conditions for transient defeasible conclusions. The above conditions are, essentially, the usual conditions for defeasible derivations in defeasible logic, we refer the reader to [18, 1, 10] for more thorough treatments. The only points we want to highlight here are:
• clause 2 requires that the complement of the literal we want to prove is not definitely provable (or definitely provable for −∂ ), but it does not specify whether it is persistent or transient: remember that what we want to achieve is to see whether the literal or its complement are provable at t but not both; in the same way, and for the same reason, q can be attacked by any compatible rule for the complement of q.
• count-as rules, as in the case of definite derivations, can play the role of deontic rules and results-in rules when all the literals in the body are ∂ X -derivable, and iii) that current derivations take precedences over persistent literals. We will return on this issue after we have introduced the conditions for persistent derivations.
The inference conditions for persistent defeasible proofs are as follows. Clauses 1 and 2 of the above proof conditions are the same as the corresponding clause for transient defeasible derivations, the only difference is in clause 3. In the same way we have a persistence clause in definite derivation we have a persistence clause to defeasibly prove/disprove a literal. Thus to show that a literal holds defeasibly at t we can check that the literal has been proved at a time t , t < t, and that for every instant of time between the two the property has not been terminated. This amounts to show that all 4. CONCLUSIONS Nute [19] proposed a Deontic Defeasible Logic which, in some respect, is similar to the framework presented here. Beside minor differences in the way rules are handled at the propositional level, the main difference is that Nute develops a system able to deal with non-temporalised and non-directed obligations. To do this, he uses one type of rule and adds explicit operators in the head of rules. Traditionally, in proof-theory, rules to introduce operators give the meaning of them. Thus using one and the same type of rule for obligation and factual conclusion does not show the real meaning of the operators involved. Moreover, it is not clear to us whether and how conversions, such as those that permit to obtain +Δ O iC from A, B → t c C and the fact that Obl i A and Obl i B are Δ-provable, can be dealt with only using a single rule type.
This paper originates from two lines of research. The first concerns the logical treatment of directed obligations. In this regard, we started, though with some differences, from the analysis of [14] . As regards other aspects such as the research into legal positions, and particularly into the notion of power, we are particularly indebted to the seminal work [13] . The second line of research concerns the temporal and dynamic treatment of obligations. In this regard, a large piece of recent literature is available. We are particularly indebted to the works by Sergot and colleagues on the use of Event Calculus, such as [3] .
Let us see shortly some issues for future research. In this paper violations are viewed as neutral with regard to obligations. If an obligation holds at a certain instant, the violation will not be considered and such an obligation will simply continue to hold until it is complied with. In [11, 8] we showed how the non-classical (substructural) connective ⊗, whose interpretation is such that p ⊗ q is read as "q is the reparation of the violation of p", can be embedded within DL. This work has to be extended to cover temporalised normative concepts. [16] has proved, for the propositional case, that the set of tagged literals can be derived from the theory in linear time in the number of rules in it. We expect not to be hard to extend this result to the modal case. The distinction of different kinds of rules does not seem to affect the complexity of the theory. The case for basic rules is the same adopted in standard DL while, for the other components, we convert relevant rules into the appropriate "extended" modal literals. At this point, the inference mechanism is the same as the standard one.
